We study the portfolio allocation decisions of Australian households using the relatively new Household Income and Labour Dynamics in Australia (HILDA) survey. We focus on household allocations to risky financial assets. Our empirical analysis considers a range of hypothesised determinants of these allocations. We find background risk factors posed by labour income uncertainty and health risk are important. Credit constraints and observed risk preferences play the expected role. A positive age gradient is identified for risky asset holdings and homeownership is associated with greater risky asset holdings. A unifying theme for many of our empirical findings is the important role played by financial awareness and knowledge in determining risky asset holdings. Many non-stockholding households appear to lack the experience and financial literacy that might enable them to benefit from direct investment in stocks.
Introduction
Household portfolio allocation is a simple business according to the stylized classical model of portfolio allocation dating back as far as Markowitz (1952) . However, as Campbell (2006) , Guiso et al (2002) and many others point out, the empirical evidence is that households do not follow the predictions of portfolio theory. Many households hold no risky financial assets (stocks or corporate bonds), while of those that do, many hold only one or a very small number of stocks rather than a diversified portfolio. A growing body of empirical and theoretical research into household financial decisions seeks to develop models that explain and predict observed portfolios or empirically identify factors explaining household portfolio allocations or some combination of the two; see Campbell (2006) for a discussion of this literature.
We add to this literature by considering the portfolio allocation decisions of Australian households, using data collected by the Household, Income and Labour Dynamics in Australia Australia to the number of countries for which the determinants of portfolio decisions regarding risky financial assets have been empirically studied.
The richness of the HILDA data allows us to bring together into one reduced form model many of the hypothesised explanations of portfolio allocation decisions. In addition to a range of demographic controls, we are able to consider the relative roles of observed preferences, credit constraints, investment substitutes, retirement status and background risks deriving from labour income uncertainty, business income, health status and committed expenditures in accounting for the low risky financial asset holdings of Australian households. The comparative richness of the data allows us to produce multiple alternative measures of many of the factors of interest, facilitating a more detailed and robust analysis of effects.
Our analysis has implications for the theoretical and modelling literature on portfolio decisions.
Institutional structures unique to Australia, such as mandatory employer based retirement savings, provide further insights for modelling portfolio behaviour that can only be derived by considering the diversity of such institutional structures across countries. For example, for a decade and a half, Australia has had in place a mandatory employer-based retirement saving scheme in parallel with a longstanding public pay-as-you-go pension scheme.
1 Since July 1992, employers have been required by federal law to make contributions (initially at least 3% of gross salary, progressively rising to 9% by July 2002) to individual retirement accounts for most employees. 2 Clearly, employer based retirement accounts such as 401(k) plans in the United States are important parts of the retirement saving and investment landscape, but are not mandatory. Australia's experience in this area may have some policy relevance for retirement saving in other countries and the ownership of risky assets through compulsory retirement accounts adds an interesting dimension to the stockholding puzzle for working households.
Consistent with other studies in the area, our empirical approach is to estimate models of the ratio of risky financial asset holdings to total financial asset holdings. We also examine separately the sub-samples comprising households in which the head is employed and the head is retired. We focus on the employed households sub-sample as labour market risks generally apply only to employed households. We focus on the retired households sub-sample because the determinants of portfolio composition are likely to differ from those of working households. In particular, retired households are permitted to make choices regarding their retirement savings, such as draw down balances, that working households cannot. As a consequence of this difference between retired and other households, retirement savings accounts (colloquially referred to as superannuation) are treated as financial assets for the retired sub-sample, while for the other samples retirement savings are treated as non-financial assets.
The main class of risky financial assets considered is shares or common stock. Share ownership is reasonably widespread in Australia. According to population weighted estimates from the HILDA data, 44 per cent of households in Australia have direct holdings of shares.
Indirect share ownership via mandatory private pension contributions is even higher, with 78
per cent of households holding private pensions, most of which will in part consist of shares.
According to the HILDA data, the mean value of shareholdings of shareholder households was approximately $80,000 in 2002 (likely to be an underestimate because extremely wealthy households are unlikely to be in the HILDA sample), while mean household superannuation holdings among households with superannuation was $108,000.
We find that, of the various background risk factors that have been considered in the literature, there is (i) a significant negative effect of labour income risk on the risky asset ratio; (ii) a 2 Approximately 90% of employees have retirement account contributions made by employers (ABS, 2006) .
Employers are not required to make contributions for employees that are either over 70 years of age, earning less than $450 per month, or under 18 years of age and working fewer than 30 hours per week.
positive and statistically significant, but economically insignificant, effect of committed (mortgage) expenditures on the risky asset ratio; and (iii) a negative and statistically significant effect of poor health status on the risky asset ratio, although this was evident only for employed households. Background risk posed by proprietary business income, studied in Heaton and Lucas (2000b) , is not found to have an impact here. We also find a strong positive effect of home ownership (either outright or mortgaged) which might offer some explanation for the committed expenditure result. These results suggest that households might be leveraging off their home-ownership to diversify their portfolios and raise their risky financial asset holdings, hence producing the positive correlations.
The health effects are not as strong as found by other studies, such as Guiso et al (1996) and Rosen and Wu (2005) , which we attribute to our explicit inclusion of variables capturing risk and intertemporal consumption preferences. That is, it appears that health primarily affects risky asset holdings via its effects on measured risk and time preferences. Indeed, our observed preference variables have strong and predictable effects. Households that consider themselves financially risk averse have a much lower risky asset ratio, while the length of a household's planning horizon has a positive impact on the risky asset ratio. Consistent with the planning horizon finding, we find that households making additional voluntary superannuation contributions have higher risky asset ratios as well.
Other notable findings include a positive impact of self-funded retiree status. The risky asset ratio of self-funded retirees, all else equal, is 0.15 higher than that of other households. In our empirical specification we employ a range of age dummies, similar to Bertaut (1998) , rather than impose a restrictive parametric form. We find all age dummies have positive and significant coefficients, showing a positive gradient with age up to the 65-69 age category, and only dropping off for the 70+ age group. This is inconsistent with the typical view and financial advice that households rotate out of risky assets as they approach retirement age (see, for example Carroll, 2002) , though it is consistent with the growth in knowledge of the investment landscape and opportunities that comes with age, as posited by King and Leape (1987) . Unsurprisingly, credit constraints are found to be associated with a negative effect on the risky asset ratio. Several of our results paint a broad picture, consistent with findings in Bertaut (1998) and Bertaut and Starr-McCluer (2002) , that educational attainment, age and immigrant status all reflect an important role for financial literacy and awareness in determining household portfolio choices. It is perhaps surprising, however, that we find no impact on the risky asset ratio of potential investment substitutes, in the form of private business ownership, ownership of second homes or superannuation balances; see for example Heaton and Lucas (2000a, b) for the importance of private business ownership for portfolio decisions.
In Section 2 we present a brief review of the empirical literature on household portfolio allocation and risky asset holdings, focusing on background risk. In Section 3 we discuss our data and explain our empirical approach. We present and analyse our empirical results in Section 4, along with a number of sensitivity analyses, presenting conclusions in Section 5.
Literature Review
Despite the existence of an equity premium (Mehra and Prescott, 1985) , many households do not directly hold equities and of those that do, few hold diversified portfolios. The failure of standard models of portfolio choices to account for this empirical regularity has provided the motivation for variations of the standard model, including relaxation of assumptions such as no transaction costs and ready access to credit, and the incorporation of a variety of other factors influencing household portfolio allocation that can be described as 'background risks'. Below we summarize the predictions of theoretical models that incorporate various background risks and review the literature that assesses their empirical importance in household portfolio allocation decisions.
The presence of background risk, initially formalised by Pratt and Zeckhauser (1987) , leads households to increase precautionary savings and avoid other risks such as stock market risk, a behaviour termed temperance by Kimball (1991) . This behaviour results for a broad class of conventional utility specifications, as described in Heaton and Lucas (2000a) . Thus, households reduce risky asset holdings due to temperance arising from the background risks they face.
Background risk from labour income uncertainty is typically expected to reduce risky asset holdings, though calibration models incorporating labour income risk have mixed success in predicting avoidance of risky assets; see for example Haliassos and Bertaut (1995) , Heaton and Lucas (1997) and the discussion in Heaton and Lucas (2000a) . The modelling literature has had more success considering background risks arising from proprietary business income and real estate. Heaton and Lucas (2000a) calibrate a dynamic model of portfolio allocation to US data and show that background risks arising from labour and proprietary business income can predict some of the low stockholding empirically observed for the US. Fratantoni (2001) considers housing mortgage commitments in a model calibrated to US data, finding that mortgage commitments together with labour income risk induces temperance leading households to reduce risky asset holdings. 3 Health risk can operate in a similar way (Campbell 2006 ; while health costs can be insured to varying degrees, health risk is expected to exacerbate labour income risk and has implications for investment horizon arising from its impact on life expectancy.
These theoretical predictions have naturally led to the empirical assessment of the role of background risk in the portfolio allocations of households. This empirical literature is summarised in Table 1 . As can be seen, a number of these factors have been found to have explanatory power in household portfolio allocation decisions. In particular, background risks associated with labour income, committed expenditure, proprietary business income and health risks have all been found to play some role in the determinations of risky financial asset holdings. However, each of the studies listed in Table 1 considers only a subset of these types of background risk. One of the key strengths of our empirical analysis is that we consider all of these background risk factors simultaneously in order to identify their relative roles in explaining household portfolio choice.
In addition to background risk, several studies in Table 1 consider the role of borrowing constraints, finding lower risky financial asset holdings among constrained households. This most likely arises through a precautionary effect. Alternatively, households that would like to leverage into more risky financial assets may find themselves unable to take the kinds of financial risks they desire. Another notable result found in most studies in Table 1 is the positive impact of educational attainment on holdings of risky financial assets. One explanation for the positive effect of educational attainment is that education lowers information costs for investors, and improves financial awareness (Bertaut, 1998) .
Data and Empirical approach

Data
Our data source is the Household, Income and Labour Dynamics in Australia (HILDA) Survey, a nationally representative household-based panel study which began in 2001. In each wave, information is collected on socio-demographic characteristics, income, labour market activity, health, and a range of other personal and family characteristics. The key wave of this panel for our purposes is Wave 2 (2002), where a special wealth module was incorporated into the questionnaires. This survey instrument forms the foundation of our analysis of financial asset holdings.
The Wave 2 data file contains information on 14,020 respondents over the age of 15 residing in 7,245 households. We restrict analysis to the 6,784 households that are 'standard' families:
single person, couple, sole parent or couple with children. We analyse household asset holdings and our unit of analysis is correspondingly the household rather than the individual.
Personal characteristics relate to the 'head' of the household, defined to be the adult male in couple households. Only households with complete information on all characteristics used in the analysis are retained, reducing the estimation sample to 5,290 observations. We also analyse two sub-samples. First, we consider the sub-sample of employed persons only (3,509 observations), which facilitates inclusion of additional covariates related to labour income risk.
This has the effect of excluding most persons over 65 years of age and many persons under 65 years of age with very low financial assets. Second, models are estimated on the sub-sample of households in which the head is retired and over 55 years of age (1,195 observations).
Empirical method and asset measures
Our empirical approach is to study the determinants of the proportion of financial assets held as risky assets. It is based on Guiso et al (1996) , who study the role of background risk in the portfolio decisions of Italian households. Household demand for risky assets is treated as a two stage decision, whereby households first decide whether to hold risky assets or not, and then decide on the allocation among assets. As a consequence, we find that some households hold no risky financial assets, while for others the only financial assets held are risky. Given our dependent variable is the risky asset share of financial assets, this clustering at zero and one is handled by estimating a Tobit model.
Facilitated by the comparative richness of our data source, we build on the empirical approach of Guiso et al (1996) (1) Equity investments, comprising shares, managed funds (mutual funds) and property trusts (real estate investment trusts, or REIT's).
(2) Cash investments, comprising government bonds, corporate bonds, debentures, certificates of deposit, mortgage-backed securities.
(3) Trust funds, including children's trust funds but excluding property trusts.
(4) Bank accounts.
(5) Cash-in value of redeemable life insurance policies (excluding policies only payable on death).
(6) Superannuation or structured retirement savings (pension plans).
Typically, the risky financial asset class would include equity holdings (direct and indirect), and a range of debt instruments excluding government bonds. In our analysis, we assume risky financial assets comprise category (1). Categories (2), (3) and (6) also potentially contain risky financial assets. However, few households own cash investments or trust funds (3% of the sample in each case), so results are little-affected by how these asset categories are treated.
Our core approach treats superannuation as a non-financial asset (i.e., excludes superannuation, category (6)). The risky asset ratio is therefore the value of category (1) as a proportion of the sum of the values of categories (1) to (5). The exclusion of superannuation is warranted by its essentially mandatory nature, making it inappropriate to interpret such holdings as a choice variable. It is also highly illiquid for persons below the 'preservation age', the minimum age at which these retirement savings can be accessed, 55 years in 2002. These properties imply superannuation does not have all of the characteristics typical of financial assets. Our approach is consistent with the treatment of retirement savings schemes in other studies. For example, Fratantoni (1998) and Guiso et al (1996) both exclude retirement savings from financial assets, while Rosen and Wu (2004) consider retirement savings (IRAs and Keoghs) as a distinct financial asset class that is neither 'risky' nor 'non-risky'.
Although superannuation is excluded from the dependent variable, there is strong potential for substitution effects arising from superannuation balances. In response, we include several variables for superannuation balances as explanatory factors for risky asset holdings.
Furthermore, while there are clear reasons for treating superannuation as a non-financial asset for the full and employed samples, this approach is arguably not appropriate for retired households, for whom superannuation contributions are not mandatory and for whom account balances are readily drawn down. 4 We therefore take an alternative approach to defining financial assets for the retired household sub-sample, treating superannuation as a risky financial asset. For this approach, the risky asset ratio is equal to equity holdings plus superannuation holdings (categories (1) and (6)) divided by the sum of categories (1) to (6).
The sensitivity of the results to alternative treatments of superannuation is examined for all three of the samples. Table 2 presents estimates for all households, the middle panel restricts to households in which the head is employed, while the bottom panel restricts to households in which the head is retired and over 55 years of age. For this last sample, we present the risky asset ratio that treats superannuation as a risky financial asset.
Excluding superannuation, the mean holding of risky assets among all households is $35,800.
The distribution is highly positively skewed, with the median household holding no risky assets, the household at the 75 th percentile holding $10,000 in risky assets, and the household at the 90 th percentile holding $78,000 in risky assets. Distributions of asset holdings are strikingly similar when we restrict to households in which the head is employed. This would seem to be the net outcome of omission of two categories of household: retired households, who -as the bottom panel of Table 2 indicates -tend to have high levels of assets; and non-employed working-age households, who -by inference -tend to have few assets.
Explanatory variables
A range of factors potentially impacting on risky asset holdings are considered, including labour income risk, business income risk, health risk, committed expenditure risk, liquidity and credit constraints, mandatory retirement savings and risk and time preferences. A variety of variables are created to capture these effects, details of which follow.
Labour income risk
Given our interest in household portfolio allocation, we focus on household labour income risk measured by realised variability of household labour income over the five waves (years) of data available, which we interpret as a proxy for subjectively assessed labour income risk faced by the household. A key advantage of this measure is that it can account for the many potential unobserved sources of labour income risk, such as family structure changes and knowledge of individuals' labour market plans. The main limitation is that households may not fully anticipate realised volatility. A further concern is that labour income risk may be endogenous with respect to risky financial asset holdings. However, we think it unlikely that labour market activities are significantly affected by risky asset holdings, since it is considerably easier for individuals to affect risk exposure in financial assets than to affect income risk exposure in the labour market. In any case, such endogeneity does not invalidate the analysis. The question of interest is whether there is evidence that households substitute between the two forms of risk, which does not require causality to run in only one direction. An alternative measure of labour income risk is provided by a dummy variable equal to one if there are two or more earners in the household. All else equal, multiple earners will correspond to lower labour income risk than one earner in the household, as long as individual labour income is imperfectly correlated among household members. A no earner dummy variable is also included, making the single earner the omitted dummy or base case.
We also consider various other measures of labour income risk that are defined only for households in which the head is employed and are therefore only included in specifications estimated on an employed households sample. These measures comprise variables for casual employment status, self-employment status, sector of employment, subjective assessment of job prospects, satisfaction with job security, job tenure, and earnings share of the household's highest earner.
Casual employment, a form of employment peculiar to Australia, is generally perceived to be less secure than other forms of employment because employers face fewer legal constraints on reducing hours of work or dismissing employees altogether, while the absence of sick leave entitlements also increases risk. Casual employment is thus interpreted as greater exposure to labour income risk. Self-employment and employment in the private for-profit sector are likewise interpreted as increased exposure to labour market risk.
Self-assessed job prospects are measured by the individual's assessment of the probability of holding the current job, or one at least as good, in one year's time. This is derived from survey questions on the probability of losing the current job within the next year and the probability that, in the event of job loss, the individual could secure another job at least as good as the current job within the next year. The measure is constructed such that higher values correspond to a greater probability of job loss, which approximately corresponds to greater perceived labour income risk. In principle, a higher probability of job loss could, beyond some point, be interpreted as increased certainty about future labour income: relatively certain future job loss becomes a known adverse change to future labour income, rather than increased uncertainty about future labour income. However, in practice, this self-assessed probability is less than 0.5 for 99% of employed persons in the sample, so that an individual with a higher value of this probability than another individual therefore nearly always faces greater uncertainty.
Satisfaction with job security is rated on an eleven-point scale from completely dissatisfied to completely satisfied. Job tenure, measured in years, provides a further measure of job security and therefore labour income risk. The share of labour income earned by highest income earner in the household is a measure of diversification of the labour income portfolio. All else equal, the greater this share, the greater the risk.
Health risk
Poor health can be viewed as a source of labour income risk as well as a source of 'expense' risk -the possibility that financial resources will be required to meet health care expenses.
Although Australia in principle has universal access to publicly funded health care, in practice health care is often associated with considerable private expense. Further, it is not legally possible to obtain private health insurance for most out-of-hospital medical treatments. Poor health may also impact on planning horizon, particularly if life expectancy is correlated with health, although we attempt to independently control for time preferences in most of the specifications estimated.
Our health measure is obtained from respondent self-assessments of general health on a fivepoint scale. We classify individuals as in either 'good' health (assess health to be excellent or very good), 'fair' health (assess health to be good or fair) or 'poor' health (assess health to be poor).
Committed expenditure risk
As discussed in Section 2, mortgage repayment commitments, constitute a background risk that may impact on financial portfolio composition. In principle, there are other potential committed expenditures, such as private school tuition fees and non-housing loan repayments, but we follow Fratantoni (1998) and focus on mortgage and rent expenses tied to the primary residence. Potential endogeneity of committed expenditures with respect to portfolio choice is an issue that concerned Fratantoni. However, as we have argued for labour income risk, our key empirical question is whether there is a relationship between risky financial asset holdings and committed expenditure. Indeed, the causal effect of the latter on the former is not meaningful because the two quantities are clearly jointly determined by the household. 6 As we noted in respect of labour income risk, endogeneity concerns may persist if committed expenditures are thought to be correlated with unobserved determinants of risky asset holdings. However, this does not appear to be the basis for Fratantoni's (1998) concerns. Another measure of committed expenditure risk we considered was the respondent's subjective assessment of adequacy of income relative to needs and commitments. However, we did not find any statistically significant effects associated with this measure.
Liquidity and credit constraints
Liquidity and credit constraints are included in the model through two variables. The first is a qualitative variable that measures the household's ability to raise a relatively large amount of funds ($2,000) at short notice. We define a dummy indicator equal to one if the household head could not raise $2,000, or would have to do something drastic, such as sell an important possession, to raise the money. The second credit constraint variable uses information on whether household credit cards are paid off in full on a monthly basis. A dummy indicator is employed for households which do not usually pay off most or all of the credit card debt each month. We take this as a measure of credit constraints because credit cards are relatively easily accessible but are generally a very expensive commercially available source of funds. If a household was not credit constrained, they would likely substitute cheaper alternative sources of funds for credit card debt. 7 We also include a dummy variable equal to one if the household does not hold any credit cards. Although not necessarily the case, our prior expectation is that this is a measure of low access to credit, since it is likely many of these households do not hold cards because of a more general inability to obtain credit.
Investment substitutes
Potential effects of risky non-financial investment holdings on the risky financial asset ratio are considered by including indicator variables for home-ownership, second-house ownership and business ownership. 8 As well as offering an investment substitute for equities, business ownership reflects entrepreneurial income background risks discussed in Section 2 and in Heaton and Lucas (2000a, b) and is expected to have a negative effect on risky financial asset holdings.
The role of home-ownership is complicated by its dual role as a durable consumption good as well as a risky non-financial investment. Housing is typically highly geared, and forms a large proportion of net worth that is not divisible without high transaction costs. Thus home owners are expected to hold less risky financial assets. However, more recent innovations in Australian mortgage markets have enabled financially literate households to draw on housing equity for other investment purposes, thereby reducing the incidence of corner-solution type portfolio outcomes where households have close to 100% portfolio weight in real estate.
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Mandatory retirement savings
In the main analysis, which treats superannuation as a non-financial asset, we allow for superannuation balances to affect the risky asset share of financial asset holdings. Like nonfinancial investment holdings, the primary hypothesised effect is a substitution effect. Effects of superannuation should in principle depend on the type of superannuation product held, of which there are two broad classes. The accumulation-style account, the predominant form of superannuation, is typically of uncertain value, often largely comprising equities, and would therefore be expected to negatively impact on the risky asset ratio through a substitution effect.
The second type of product, the defined-benefit account, is of somewhat deterministic value, based on salary and years of employment, which we do not expect to substitute for risky assets.
We further distinguish superannuation balances of retired persons, since the illiquidity of the superannuation of non-retired persons does not apply to retired persons. Thus, models estimated on all persons contain three variables for superannuation balances -accumulation, defined benefit and retired -all expressed as proportions of net worth.
We additionally consider effects associated with making voluntary contributions to a superannuation fund using a dummy variable equal to one if the respondent makes voluntary contributions (whether regularly or occasionally). Such voluntary contributions have the potential to impact on risky asset holdings, particularly since they will invariably be to accumulation-style accounts that are largely comprised of risky assets. Importantly, this does not capture effects of mandatory retirement savings and instead reflects a preference for retirement style savings accounts, potentially for tax reasons or because of the highly illiquid nature of these accounts.
Preferences
Direct measures of preferences with respect to both risk and time are available in the HILDA The rate of time preference is measured by responses to a survey question on the individual's financial planning horizon, for which possible responses were 'next week', 'next few months', 'next year', 'next 2-4 years', 'next 5-10 years' or 'more than 10 years'. A longer savings horizon would be expected to be associated with greater willingness to bear risk on financial assets.
Other factors
We consider the possibility that retirement has implications for preferences with regard to risky asset holdings, and allow this effect to differ depending on whether the retiree is self-funded (more than half of income coming from private sources) or government-reliant (more than half of income comes from government). Since we control for age, and there is in any case considerable overlap in the age distributions of retired and non-retired persons, these variables are capturing retirement effects, not age effects. We also include variables for household type, educational attainment, country of birth, English proficiency, region of residence, income and wealth (net worth). Details for these and all other variables along with summary statistics for all covariates are provided in the Appendix. 
Results
Full sample
Standard Controls
Age plays an important role in risky asset holdings. We include dummies for different age categories and find the relationship between age and the risky asset ratio does not fit the quadratic parametric form which is often assumed by researchers. Prime-age individuals are usually expected to be willing and able to take greater investment risks, which should be reflected in the coefficients of the 25-34 and 35-44 dummies having the greatest coefficients.
However, we obtain stable coefficients over the 25-54 years age range, and rising coefficients over the 55 to 69 years age range, the latter age range being a time when we might expect households to be reducing exposure to risk due to the imminence of retirement and subsequent dependence on savings and related income streams. For ages beyond 70 years, we do observe a decrease in the coefficient but the positive impact of being in this age category (0.299) is still greater than all categories below 64. These results are consistent with increased knowledge of the investment landscape and opportunities that come with age and experience; see King and Leape (1987) , Bertaut (1998) .
Variables included for retirement status furthermore show that self-funded retiree status has a positive and statistically significant impact on the risky asset ratio, raising it by 0.145 relative to households where the head of household is not retired. It should be reiterated that this result is found after we have controlled for age and net worth. It suggests that self-funded retirees are financing their retirement through greater levels of risky assets relative to other households. whether an NESB immigrant or not, three levels of educational attainment and three age groups). Panel A presents results for all persons. The strong predicted effects from the coefficient estimates do indeed translate into a strong ordering of actual risky asset ratios by inferred level of financial literacy. There is, however, some tendency for the coefficient estimates to overstate the importance of financial literacy, with actual risky asset ratios tending to be slightly higher than predicted for those with low levels of financial literacy.
The coefficients on the net worth variables are both positive and statistically significant, which translates to an increasing quadratic function: as net worth increases, it has a larger positive impact in the risky asset ratio. For a household with mean net worth ($410,000, Table 2 ), an increase in net worth of $100,000 raises the risky asset ratio by 0.042. Point estimates for the household income indicate a positive effect that is decreasing in income, but almost all coefficients are statistically insignificant.
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Credit Constraints
The estimates for the variables capturing credit constraints imply that constrained households are less likely to hold risky assets. All three of our credit constraint variables have negative and significant coefficients, suggesting each captures different dimensions of credit constraints. Not regularly paying off the credit card, which would seem to reflect either inability to access cheaper credit or imperfect information about credit options, is associated with a 0.065 lower risky asset ratio. Not possessing a credit card is associated with even lower (by 0.149) risky asset ratio. Households with no credit cards are either poor candidates for credit or deliberately avoid credit, suggesting either high income uncertainty or poor financial awareness has a negative impact on risky asset holdings. Although one might expect difficulty raising $2,000 to be highly correlated with failure to regularly pay off credit cards, we nonetheless find a significant effect of such a financial constraint, lowering the risky asset ratio by 0.177.
Background Risk: Health
Neither of the dummy variables for health status is significant in explaining the household's risky asset ratio in our core specification. This is at odds with findings of previous researchers, such as Guiso et al (1996) and Rosen and Wu (2005) . However, the point estimates are consistent with a negative association between health and risky asset holdings. Furthermore, in
Model 2 in Table 3 , where we exclude the risk and time preference variables, a stronger ordering by health status does appear -although the coefficient on the 'poor health' dummy is still not significant. One interpretation of this finding is that, while poor health does not alter risk and time preferences, it does alter the risk and time situation of the individual, which in turn affects measured risk and time preferences. Specifically people in poor health may be less 10 Specifications were estimated that contained dummy variables for income and net worth as an alternative to the quadratic specifications reported. Inferences on wealth and income effects were not affected, and no other coefficient estimates were noticeably affected.
willing to take financial risks and may have shorter savings horizons, not because of inherently greater risk aversion and higher discount rates, but because of the increased exposure to risk caused by poor health. 11 Thus, our risk and time preference variables are arguably in part capturing the background risk effects of health. Estimates in Model 1 may therefore understate the true effects of health status. We also note that previous studies, for example Rosen and Wu (2005) , have included quadratic terms for age rather than the age dummies we include. We did indeed find (in unreported analysis) that health effects are stronger when the parametric specification is adopted. Given the very strong correlation between health status and age, coefficients on health variables in previous studies may have been confounding lifecycle and health effects on the risky asset ratio.
Background Risk: Labour Income
In the first two specifications reported in Table 3 , exposure to labour income risk is measured by realised labour income risk, as measured by the coefficient of variation of household labour income over the five years following the initial survey. As expected, we find a negative and statistically significant effect, with a one-unit increase in the coefficient of variation associated with a 0.052 decrease in the risky asset ratio. As discussed in Section 3, we assume that this variable is a good proxy for perceived labour income risk faced by the household, and therefore interpret it as showing that households reduce their risky assets ratio when they perceive they face greater labour income risk. Model 3 includes additional measures of household labour income risk: a dummy variable for multiple earners in the household and a dummy variable for no earners in the household. The coefficient on the realised labour income risk variable is littleaffected. The estimates for the additional variables are not significant, a result unchanged by the omission of the realised labour income risk variable (Model 4).
12 Figure 1 and Table 5 provide some further information about the effects of household labour income risk, as measured by realised household labour income volatility, on risky asset holdings. Figure 1 compares, for Model 1, mean actual and predicted risky asset shares by 11 In principle, other background risks could also manifest as differences in measured preferences. However, we do not find evidence of this in practice, with coefficient estimates for other background risk variables insensitive to the exclusion of the preferences variables.
12 Additional models were estimated that distinguished spousal labour income volatility from head labour income volatility (and which included a variable for correlation between head's and spouse's labour income). Although point estimates were, as expected, all negative, most were not statistically significant. It is therefore not possible to identify the distinct roles of these sources of labour income risk with an acceptable level of statistical precision, and so these results are not reported.
level of labour income risk. The motivation for the graph is the potential for the estimating equation to identify labour income risk effects from only a portion of the support and thereby produce misleading results on the relationship between labour income risk and portfolio composition over the full range of variation of the explanatory variable. In fact, Figure 1 shows a quite close correspondence between the actual and predicted series. We also note that sizeable differences in the mean risky asset share of financial assets by level of labour income risk are also evident -although of course this is not a graphical representation of the effects of labour income risk on risky asset holdings because other characteristics are not randomly distributed across the different levels of labour income risk (hence the non-monotonic pattern). Table 5 presents correlation coefficients between predicted and actual risky asset ratios within each of six categories for level of labour income risk. Essentially, it describes the goodness of fit of the model at different levels of labour income risk. The correlation coefficient ranges from 0.4 to 0.5, implying model's explanatory power does not vary substantially across the range of household labour income risk observed in the data.
Background Risk: Committed Expenditures
Variables for the ratio of mortgage repayments to income and the ratio of rent payments to income are included as measures of committed expenditure risk. We find the rent ratio is not statistically significant, while committed expenditures reflected by the mortgage ratio have a positive and statistically significant effect, in contrast with Fratantoni (1998) but consistent with the effects of mortgages found in Heaton and Lucas (2000b) and Yamishita (2003) .
However, given that the mortgage ratio rarely rises above 0.5, the estimated effect does not have strong economic implications. A sensible upper bound on the mortgage ratio of say, 0.4 (which exceeds the mortgage ratio for over 95% of households) implies an increase in the risky asset ratio of 0.004 relative to a household with a mortgage ratio of zero. This result is, however, statistically robust to the various model specifications we consider in Table 3 .
Investment Substitutes
In our core specification we focus on home ownership as a substitute for risky financial assets.
Consistent with this perspective is the view that home ownership is itself, independent of committed expenditure associated with mortgage repayments, a source of background risk arising from house price volatility. Surprisingly, however, home ownership is associated with a sizeable positive impact on the risky asset ratio. After controlling for all other characteristics, including age and net worth, home owners have a risky asset ratio 0.091 higher than other households. The existing literature has generally found that home owners hold fewer risky financial assets, see for example Heaton and Lucas (2000b) and Yamishita (2003) .
In order to better understand the seemingly counter-intuitive nature of committed expenditure risk and homeownership, it is useful to consider the evolution of the mortgage market in Australia. Since the mid-1980s, home lending has been characterised by aggressive competition between lenders and substantial innovation in mortgage products offered. As a consequence, home owners have had access to quite cheap (mortgage-backed) credit that may be used for a variety of purposes. This would be expected to increase the risky asset ratio for homeowners. It creates the potential for measured committed expenditure, and home ownership status to reflect the effects of easily accessed and cheap credit for other investment purposes, including equity investments. In empirical estimation, home-ownership status does not entirely pick up credit accessibility, since there is variation in mortgage products held.
Furthermore, it is likely that measured committed expenditure is capturing unobserved preferences for investing in equities: home-owners with greater desire for equities will have higher committed expenditures than other home-owners because they will increase borrowings against their houses to finance their equity investments. Thus, both variables would seem to be capturing credit availability rather than substitution effects or committed expenditure risk.
We introduce a number of variables for other potential investment substitutes in Models 3 and 4, including second (and subsequent) houses, business ownership and superannuation. Of all these investment substitutes, the only variable that is statistically significant is the dummy indicator that is equal to one for households that make voluntary contributions to superannuation. However, the coefficient estimate is positive, implying complementarity rather than substitution between non-mandatory superannuation and risky asset holdings. It appears that this variable is capturing a preference for greater equity holdings that is not captured by other variables. Our results on substitution effects run counter to the expectation that households with second homes and private businesses might substitute these investments for risky financial assets. For example, Heaton and Lucas (2000b) find a greater level of proprietary business income reduces risky asset holdings due to associated background risks.
Directly Observed Preferences
Our last category of covariates provides measures of time and risk preferences. The savings horizon variable ranges from zero to five, a higher value indicating a longer horizon. The coefficient implies a household with a planning horizon in excess of 10 years will have a risky asset ratio 0.09 ( ) 0.018 5 × greater than a household with a planning horizon of 'next week'.
The dummy indicator for risk aversion is statistically significant and of the expected sign.
Households unwilling to take risks with financial investments have a predicted risky asset ratio 0.253 lower than other observationally similar households.
Employed households sub-sample
Labour income risk is likely to be of greatest relevance to portfolio decisions of employed households. Table 6 reports results from the analysis of the population sub-group comprising households in which the head is employed, facilitating the inclusion of additional variables that are not defined, or not relevant, for non-employed households. In particular, we add variables for casual employment status, self-employment status, sector of employment, tenure of current employment, subjective probability of retaining the current job, share of household income earned by the household's highest earner, and satisfaction with job security, each of which potentially captures a different dimension of labour income risk. Table 4 shows sizeable financial literacy effects are present in the employed sub-sample, although the strength of the relationship is perhaps weaker than found for the full sample, possibly reflecting less variation in financial literacy among employed persons than the population as a whole. Labour income risk maintains its negative impact on the risky asset ratio. The same robustness analysis on labour income risk, as for the full sample, is conducted and presented in Figure 1 and Table 5 . These results confirm the importance of labour income risk as a determinant of the risky asset ratio, while the predictive power of the model is slightly weaker at the extremes of labour income risk.
There are some notable exceptions to the similarities. First, residing in a major city is associated with a significantly higher risky asset ratio in the employed sample, whereas in the full sample no effect was evident. Second, while net worth has positive effects on the risky asset ratio in the employed sample, the quadratic net worth term takes the opposite sign to that obtained in the full sample, implying a decreasing (rather than increasing) rate of increase of the risky asset ratio as net worth increases. Third, the magnitudes of the effects associated with health status are somewhat larger in the employed sample. Indeed, a significant negative effect of 'okay health' compared with 'good health' is evident even in Model 1, which includes directly observed preferences. Finally, the coefficient on the home owner variable is almost halved to 0.054 from 0.091 for the full sample.
As in Table 3 , Models 3 and 4 consider additional labour income risk measures, but the restriction to employed households facilitates consideration of a much larger number of factors.
However, none of the added variables exerts a significant effect on the risky asset ratio. omitted, the coefficient on Poor health becomes significant at the 10% level, with a coefficient of -0.246. We might infer from this that households ex ante have some idea that they face labour income risk arising from poor health and as a result reduce their risky asset ratio.
Retired households sub-sample
In Table 7 we present estimates for retired households only, motivated by the expectation that the determinants of portfolio composition are likely to differ from those of working households. Retired households face quite different circumstances to working households, but perhaps the most important reason for separately examining retired households is that retired persons (over 55 year of age) are permitted to make choices regarding their retirement savings
that are not open to working households. This in itself is likely to lead to different behaviour with regards to portfolio choice.
The different regulatory treatment of superannuation for retired households also implies an alternative definition of the risky asset ratio is appropriate. Upon retirement, households have a range of options, such as taking lump sums or transferring these retirement savings into an allocated pension. 13 There are in fact few binding regulatory constraints on the use of superannuation for retired households over 55 years of age: it may be converted into any form desired, or indeed completely consumed at the owner's discretion. We therefore treat superannuation as a financial asset for the retired household sub-sample.
In Table 7 , Models 2, 3 and 4 consider similar variations from our core specification, Model 1, as in Tables 3 and 6 . A number of similarities with the results from the full and employed households samples are evident, but there are also some differences, and new insights that are not obvious from the other samples.
The risky asset ratio does not differ significantly among the 55-59, 60-64 and 65-69 age groups, but -consistent with a shorter average investment horizon -those aged over 70 years have somewhat lower risky asset ratios, while the risky asset ratio of self funded retirees is 13 An allocated pension is a structured investment product, available only to the retired, which offers regular pension payments with preferential tax treatments and the scope for the funds to be invested in a range of managed investment products (essentially mutual funds) with varying degrees of risk, at the discretion of the investor.
greater than government reliant retirees. Significant differences by educational attainment are restricted to bachelor's degrees vis-à-vis all other qualification levels. Poor English language ability is not statistically significant, though NESB status retains a significant negative coefficient. Credit constraints have a negative impact on the risky asset ratio of retired persons.
Health status is not a statistically significant determinant of risky asset holdings for retired households, a finding at odds with prior studies -for example, Rosen and Wu (2005) . This difference may be due to Australia's universal public health coverage providing better protection against expense risks associated with poor health -the main source of background risk for persons who are not working -than do health care systems for the elderly in other countries (in particular, the US Medicare program). There is also no evidence that household labour income risk, as measured by labour income variability, influences the risky asset ratio of retired households, though having no earners in the household has a positive effect.
14 Consistent with findings for the other samples, and as expected, we find strong negative effects of risk aversion. The savings horizon variable is not, however, associated with significant effects, perhaps reflecting the lifecycle stage of sample members, many or most of whom will be dissaving rather than saving. As with other households, home ownership has a positive impact on the risky asset ratio for retired households, acting to increase the ratio by 0.131, and suggesting that even for retired households, homeownership facilitates diversification into risky financial assets. Second-home ownership lowers the risky asset ratio by 0.100, a substitution effect that was not evident in the other samples. Business ownership has a negative effect but it is not statistically significant.
We also find committed expenditures in the form of rent payments are positively related to risky asset holdings for retired households. Unlike the positive coefficients evident for mortgage payments in the other samples, there is no obvious explanation for this relationship.
Retired households may choose to rent in order to invest in risky financial assets, but if the underlying driver is a substitution of risky financial assets for home ownership, this effect ought be captured by the home-ownership dummy; and one would not expect the risky asset ratio to be increasing in the proportion of household income paid in rent.
Alternative treatments of superannuation
The mandatory and illiquid nature of superannuation for non-retired households suggests it is most appropriately treated as a non-financial asset for these households. Similarly, its nonmandatory and liquid nature for retired households suggests it is most appropriately treated as a (risky) financial asset for retired households. Nonetheless, it is useful to consider the robustness of our findings to alternative treatments of superannuation. In Table 8 , we examine for the full sample and for the employed sub-sample the determinants of the risky asset ratio when superannuation is treated as a financial asset. Specifically, we treat superannuation as a risky financial asset if it is an 'accumulation' style account or if the household head is retired, and we treat superannuation as a non-risky financial asset if it is a 'defined benefit' style account. Note that this results in approximately 80 per cent of superannuation being treated as risky holdings. We also re-examine the determinants of the risky asset ratio for the retired subsample, treating superannuation as a non-financial asset. All of the results presented in Table 8 are for the Model 1 specification.
For all three samples, effects attributable to background risk factors, credit constraints and preferences are mostly qualitatively insensitive to the alternative treatment of superannuation.
Qualitative differences are apparent for age and education variables. To the extent that these are proximate measures of financial literacy, these differences are consistent with the nondiscretionary properties of superannuation for non-retired households. In the full and employed households samples, single female and sole parent households and those in poor health also have significantly lower risky asset ratios in the case where superannuation is treated as a financial asset. Since superannuation balances are for most people closely linked to accumulated labour market earnings, and 80 per cent of superannuation is treated as risky in the models estimated in Table 8 , this most likely reflects the lower lifetime earnings of households in these groups.
Conclusions
In this study we have considered, in a single unified framework, the roles played in the determination of household risky asset holdings by a range of background risk and other factors. We find risky asset holdings to be discouraged by labour income uncertainty and poor health. In addition to these background risk factors, various effects are identified that collectively signal the important role of financial awareness and literacy. These effects include positive correlations between the risky asset ratio and educational attainment, a positive age gradient on the risky asset ratio and negative correlations of NESB immigrant status and poor English skills with the risky asset ratio. Immigrants are unfamiliar with the Australian financial landscape and poor English makes the acquisition of such knowledge difficult. The positive age gradient reflects the growing body of knowledge and experience that comes with age (King and Leape, 1987) . These financial awareness effects are discussed in Guiso et al (2002) and are consistent with findings in Bertaut (1998) and Bertaut and Starr-McCluer (2002) .
We also find that home-ownership has a positive association with the risky asset ratio. Our interpretation of this finding is that negative effects on risky asset holdings deriving from the indivisibilities and conflict between consumption and investment arising from home ownership are outweighed by the positive effects of access to cheap credit provided by home ownership.
We further find, consistent with expectations, the risky asset ratio is decreasing in degree of risk aversion, increasing in the length of the household's investment planning horizon and decreasing in the extent to which the household is credit constrained. Evidence is also found that self-funded retirees are more willing to hold risky assets.
Our findings, supporting the role of poor financial awareness, are consistent with the focus in
Campbell (2006), where non-participation in risky asset markets and poor diversification are argued to result from investment mistakes. As would be expected under this hypothesis, we find these mistakes more likely to be made by less-educated households and those likely to have less knowledge of and experience in the Australian financial landscape. Conversely, results on homeownership and committed expenditure suggest many financially sophisticated households exploit mortgage markets and the collateral offered by their homes to diversify their portfolios into risky financial assets like shares and managed (mutual) funds.
The pivotal role played by financial literacy implies that promotion of financial awareness in the community may be an effective tool for increasing households' risky financial asset
holdings. An alternative policy recommendation is that governments resolve this market failure by mandating risky asset holding. The Australian government has done this through compulsory employer-based superannuation contributions, ensuring all working households indirectly own some risky financial assets. We find that superannuation balances have no discernable impact on direct holdings of risky assets, implying compulsory retirement savings have been effective in increasing overall (direct and indirect) risky asset holdings. Risky asset holdings may also be increased simply by providing incentives for retirement savings. For example, Bertaut and Starr-McCluer (2002) find that growth in indirect stock holdings similar to that experienced in Australia has been achieved in the US through the introduction of relatively flexible, employment-based, tax-deferred retirement savings accounts. -likelihood -3414.9 -3499.3 -3411.8 -3414.5 Notes: Sample size: 5,291; Left-censored: 2982; Right-censored: 27. Tests of joint significance were conducted on: (a) the health variables; (b) the labour income risk variables; (c) the two investment substitute dummies 'own second house' and 'own a business'; and (d) the variables for the superannuation share of net worth. Tests were only conducted for those cases where none the individual variables in the relevant group (a, b, c or d) was significant at the 10% level on its own. For example, the health variables were jointly tested for Model 1, but not Model 2. We failed to reject the null at the 10% level for all such variable groups in all models. Ordering of financial literacy level is indeterminate for some comparisons. Specifically, moving from 'NESB' to 'not NESB' may not represent an increase in financial literacy if age or educational attainment is also decreased; moving to a higher education group may not represent an increase in financial literacy if also moving from 'not NESB' to 'NESB' or to a lower age group; and moving to a higher age group may not represent an increase in financial literacy if also moving from 'not NESB' to 'NESB' or to a lower education group. Notes: Sample size: 3,512; Left-censored: 1844; Right-censored: 22. Tests of joint significance were conducted as per Table 3 . We failed to reject the null at the 10% level for all variable groups in which no variable was individually significantly different from zero. Employed in a private sector for-profit organisation Probability don't retain job Self-assessed probability of losing job in next 12 months multiplied by one minus selfassessed probability that, in the event of job loss, will find and accept a job at least as good as the current job. This variable is defined for employed persons only and is set to zero for employers and self-employed persons. Highest earner share Share of household labour income earned by the highest earner in the household. Defined only for households with at least one person employed. Job security dissatisfaction Dissatisfaction with job security, ranging from 0 (completely satisfied) to 10 (completely dissatisfied).
Job tenure
Continuous years of employment with current employer.
Committed expenditure
Mortgage ratio Annual total mortgage repayments as a proportion of annual household disposable income Rent ratio Annual rent payments on primary residence as a proportion of annual household disposable income.
Substitute investments
Home owner Own primary residence (whether paying off mortgage or not) (dummy) Own second house Own a house other than primary residence (dummy) Own a business Own a business (dummy) Super share of NW -accum
Value of superannuation as a proportion of net worth for persons who are not retired and hold superannuation predominately in accumulation style accounts Super share of NW -defined
Value of superannuation as a proportion of net worth for persons who are not retired and hold superannuation predominately in defined-benefit style accounts Super share of NW -retired
Value of superannuation as a proportion of net worth for persons who are retired Voluntary super contributions Make non-mandatory contributions to a superannuation fund (either regularly or occasionally)
Directly observed preferences Saving horizon Financial planning horizon, ranging from 0 (next week) to 5 (more than 10 years) Risk averse Not willing to take any financial risks with cash used for savings or investment (dummy) No cash Never has any spare cash for savings or investment (dummy) 
